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#2A-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POUGHKEEPSIE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
and CASE NO. U-83 60 
POUGHKEEPSIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
PARA-PROFESSIONALS. LOCAL 3180B. 
AFSCME. COUNCIL 66. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
DAVID S. SHAW. ESQ. (DAVID S. SHAW. ESQ. and GARRETT L. 
SILVEIRA. ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
FREDERICK J. PFEIFER. ESQ., for Charging Party 
v
 -' BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Poughkeepsie City School District (District) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that it violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally changing terms 
and conditions of employment involving employees in units 
represented by the Poughkeepsie Public Schools 
Para-Professionals, Local 3180B, AFSCME, Council 66, AFL-CIO 
(Association). 
The charge alleges that the District unilaterally 
instituted a policy of requiring some employees taking sick 
leave or illness-in-the-family leave to justify some of such 
( J 
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leave by submitting medical documentation.-
FACTS 
On September 1, 1985, the District issued a policy 
statement regarding the sick leave rights of unit employees. 
Intending to restate the existing practice, it announced that 
employees in the unit represented by the Association shall be 
allowed 12 days paid sick leave each year and three days paid 
2/ illness-in-the-family leave.— It then went on to state 
that employees who take more than ten days of such leave 
without proper medical documentation will be presumed to have 
abused their leave rights. Similarly, employees who take 
more than three such leave days which extend weekends or 
holidays -- without medical documentation -- are presumed to 
have abused their leave rights. Such employees are warned 
that they are in jeopardy of disciplinary action. 
1/A policy similar to that instituted for the 
Association was also instituted for employees in a unit 
represented by the Poughkeepsie Public Schools Office 
Personnel Association, and that employee organization 
joined in the charge before us. The ALJ dismissed that 
part of the charge because the District and that employee 
organization were parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement which contained provisions concerning the 
monitoring of leave abuse. She therefore concluded that 
that part of the charge merely complained about a contract 
violation. There are no exceptions to this decision. 
2/That is all it did with respect to employees in the 
Poughkeepsie Public Schools Office Personnel Association 
unit. The amount of leave provided by the expired contract 
in the unit herein was actually 12 days sick leave and two 
days illness-in-the- family leave. The charge does not 
refer to this discrepancy. 
' 1042 
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DISCUSSION 
The District argues that its policy involves a 
management prerogative — the monitoring of sick-leave. The 
Association responds that the new policy goes beyond the 
monitoring of sick leave abuse because it is applicable to 
all unit employees whether or not there is any indication 
that they are sick leave abusers. It also states that the 
change imposes an unreasonable burden upon unit employees who 
are ill because it requires them to finance the new 
process.— 
Various types of leave are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. These include personal leave and vacation, 
which might not be restricted, to specific purposes, and sick 
leave, which clearly is. When the parties agree to a 
restricted-purpose leave, such as sick leave, the employer 
has an inherent right to monitor the conduct of its employees 
who avail themselves of such leave to ascertain that they are 
using it for the purposes contemplated by the contract.— 
3/The record does not indicate whether this is so. 
It may be a reasonable implication of the announced policy 
that unit employees will have to bear the financial burden 
of going to a physician to obtain appropriate medical 
documentation, whether or not they believe that medical 
attention is required for their condition. On the other 
hand, this would not be so if the employees enjoy medical 
insurance coverage that reimburses them for such costs. 
4/Citv of Rochester. 12 PERB 1F3010, at p. 3017 (1979). 
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Here, the District has announced that it is suspicious 
that employees who take more than ten days sick leave during 
a contract year or more than three such leave days at times 
when they extend vacations or holidays are abusing their 
sick leave rights. It has further announced that it may 
initiate disciplinary action against such employees. 
Finally, it has announced that its suspicion of such 
employees would be allayed if such employees would submit 
medical documentation of some of their absences. 
This announcement has not altered any of the terms or 
conditions of employment of unit employees. The number of 
sick leave days available to them has neither been increased 
nor diminished. All that has happened is that the employees 
have been put on notice as to the standards that the 
District will be using in monitoring sick leave and as to 
circumstances which may persuade it to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings. Unit employees are given an opportunity to 
change those circumstances by submitting medical 
documentation of illness. Those choosing not to do so may, 
in the discretion of the District, be brought up on charges, 
but the burden of proving sick leave abuse would still fall 
upon the District. It is not as if the District had 
promulgated a new work rule which provides that the taking 
of sick leave without medical documentation is itself a 
chargeable offense. 
• 1C427 
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As the District's policy statement merely announced 
standards that it would apply in discipline cases and does 
not change terms and conditions of employment, it does not 
constitute improper unilateral action.— 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE REVERSE the decision of the ALJ, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Meml^ er 
Jj/Compare Elwood UFSD, 10 PERB V3107 (1977), 
regarding standards for evaluation, and Onondaga Community 
College. 11 PERB 1f3045 (1978). regarding standards for 
promotion and standards for initial appointment. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CONNETQUOT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8 312 
CONNETQUOT UNIT OF SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
LOCAL 870. LOCAL 1000 CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG & GROSS (JOHN H. GROSS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (CLAUDIA R. 
McKENNA, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Connetquot Unit of Suffolk Educational Local 870, Local 1000 
Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing, without a hearing, its charge against the 
Connetquot Central School District (District). The charge 
alleges that the District violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) by 
placing a newly hired senior account clerk on Step 6 of the 
existing salary schedule when 
the past practice and contractual provisions 
governing such hirings is explicit that a 
new hiree will not be granted greater than a 
one-step adjustment for each two years 
experience, up to a maximum of Step 4 of the 
current schedule. 0429 
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CSEA's theory of an (a) violation, as set forth in the 
charge, is that "bypassing the Union in granting such step 
increase is so destructive of the Union's status that the 
District must be deemed to have actual or presumptive 
knowledge that its actions would be coercive." Its theory of 
a (d) violation is that a unilateral payment in excess of the 
amount authorized by contract is inherently different from 
payment of an amount less than that authorized by contract. 
The latter merely seeks enforcement of a contract right, a 
matter over which PERB has no jurisdiction, but the former 
constitutes the imposition of new terms and conditions of 
employment without negotiations. 
The ALJ concluded that the (d) specification of the 
charge merely seeks interpretation of an agreement and its 
enforcement, and he therefore dismissed it. He dismissed the 
(a) violation for failure to allege facts that might indicate 
improper motivation, noting that "[a] simple breach of 
contract is not inherently detrimental to the rights of 
representation . . . ." 
The relevant provision of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement provides: 'j. 
For salary purposes only, prior service 
credit will be granted on the following 
basis for acceptable experience as 
determined by the administration: 
Experience Salary Credit 
Two Years One Year 
Four Years Two Years 
Six Years Three Years >| f)A* 
Board - U-8312 -3 
We find this language to be ambiguous. CSEA seems to 
understand the last line as if it read: 
Six or more Years Three Years 
It argues that the parties' past practice would support this 
interpretation. The District seems to understand the 
experience and salary credit tables as exemplifying the 
proposition that each two years' experience yields one 
additional year's salary credit. It. too. argues that past 
practice supports its position. We do not know what the past 
practice would show because the ALJ dismissed the charge for 
failure to state a cause of action and therefore took no 
evidence regarding past practices. 
Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law provides that mere 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement does not 
constitute an improper practice and that we may not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged contract violation unless the 
conduct complained about would otherwise constitute an 
improper practice. Here, CSEA complains about a breach of 
contract and the District defends its conduct by asserting a 
claim of right under the contract. Ordinarily, such 
allegations would indicate nothing more than a contract 
dispute even though a contract may be ambiguous and both 
parties resort to past practice to give it meaning. Here, 
however, the difference between payment of less than the 
contract amount and of more than the contract amount is 
significant. 
10431 
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u 
In County of Suffolk, 15 PERB 1F3021 (1982). we affirmed 
the decision of a hearing officer who said (14 PERB 1F4598, 
at p. 4701 [1981]): 
[A] contract was in effect. If the charge 
complained of a decrease in salaries at 
that time it would be dismissed for lack of 
JTiTrisdiction; since-pERB ftas-no-auttwitty-
to remedy a breach of a collective 
bargaining agreement, [footnote omitted] 
Bestowing greater benefits than those 
agreed to by the parties does not 
constitute a breach, however, since a 
contract creates only the minimum benefits 
which must be provided. When an employer 
desires to increase salaries it must, as 
with all other terms and conditions of 
employment, deal solely with the 
negotiation agent, and not act unilaterally. 
This rationale is correct as far as it goes in that it 
f ) indicated that there is an issue of a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law,— but more must be said 
about the matter herein. Where benefits are provided that 
are less than what is called for in a collective bargaining 
agreement, the appropriate remedy is an action in court or 
the initiation of a grievance. However, the provision of 
benefits that are more than what is called for in a 
collective bargaining agreement is inherently destructive of 
a union's representation rights. It can be construed to give 
a message that the unit employees would do better if they 
abandoned their union. An implicit promise of benefits in 
such terms would violate §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. 
.1/See also Wappinqers Central School District. 
16 PERB 1[3029 (1983) . 
Board - U-8312 
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Based on this analysis, we conclude that the charge 
herein articulates a prima facie case for violation of the 
Taylor Law. Whether or not there is such a violation turns 
upon the meaning of the parties' agreement and if only a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) were alleged, we would defer to 
7/ 
arbitration for the interpretation of it.— We do not, 
3/ however, defer §209-a.l(a) charges to arbitration.— and it 
would be inappropriate to bifurcate the instant matter. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE ORDER that the entire case be. and it 
hereby is, remanded to the ALJ for 
consideration of its merits. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
&££*_£ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
.^/We note that an appropriate grievance is pending, 
2/Addison CSD, 17 PERB 1f3076 (1984). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8005 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
DIVISION 726. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, ESQ., for Respondent 
GLADSTEIN. REIF & MEGINNISS. ESQS. (WALTER M. 
MEGINNISS, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the Amalgamated Transit 
Union. Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU). It alleges that the 
New York City Transit Authority (TA) violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law by assigning unit work to nonunit personnel on 
January 21, 1985. 
FACTS 
Although TA has the right to direct its employees to work 
overtime when such work is needed, it is the parties' practice 
for TA to request ATU to solicit volunteers for overtime. This 
practice was followed on Sunday, January 20, 1985, when the TA 
sought volunteers to service the buses at its Edgewater Depot 
in Staten Island in order to avoid problems that might be 
occasioned by the severely cold weather. There were no 
volunteers and TA did not direct any unit employees to report. 
10434 
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At 5:00 a.m., Monday, January 21, 1985, TA discovered that 
most of the buses at the Edgewater Depot would not start 
because of the severely cold weather. Between nine and ten 
hours later, Cheney, TA's Assistant General Manager for Staten 
Island, called Reuter, TA's General Manager for Staten Island, 
and informed him of the problem. 
Cheney then called Licatese, an ATU representative and 
TA's bus maintainer at the Yukon Depot in Staten Island. He 
asked Licatese to procure relief men to work at Edgewater, 
starting with the next tour of duty, 12:30 a.m., January 22. 
1985. 
Meanwhile, Reuter arranged to acquire immediate assistance 
from the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority 
(SIRTOA), an independent employer. SIRTOA sent seven employees 
along with a portable compressor and a tractor-type vehicle 
called a speed wing. One of the SIRTOA employees operated the 
speed wing. 
ATU discovered the presence of SIRTOA personnel at about 
5:00 p.m. and immediately objected to Cheney and Reuter. 
Licatese indicated that he could get unit employees to perform 
the work on overtime and Reuter agreed to remove all SIRTOA 
employees except the speed wing operator.— The switchover 
from SIRTOA to TA employees was accomplished by 7:30 p.m. 
i^The operation of a speed wing is not claimed to be 
unit work and ATU does not complain about the operation of 
the speed wing by a SIRTOA employee. 
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TA had neither requested volunteers nor directed employees 
to work overtime until the conversation between Licatese and 
Reuter at 5:00 p.m. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the six 
SIRTOA employees were performing unit work and that TA's 
assignment of such work to them without having first attempted 
to find unit employees to do it was a violation of 
§209-a.l(d). She found no real emergency which might have 
justified the Authority's conduct because it had made no effort 
to find unit employees to do the work despite having some 
opportunity to do so. She ordered it to cease and desist from 
unilaterally transferring unit work and to post an appropriate 
notice. She also ordered it to compensate "the first six unit 
employees who would have been called for overtime duty to 
perform the work performed . . . who were available to perform 
said duty and who would have so performed . . . ." 
DISCUSSION 
The Authority's exceptions present four arguments. First, 
the ALJ erred in finding that the work assigned by Reuter to 
SIRTOA employees constituted unit work, second, even if the 
work assigned constituted unit work, such assignment did not 
violate the Taylor Law because it was made under emergency 
conditions and continued only during the short period of time 
when the emergency persisted. Third, in any event, no 
violation should be found because the emergency was 
precipitated by the failure of ATU to cooperate with TA on 
Board - U-8005 -4 
January 20, 1985 by making available unit employees who would 
keep the buses' motors running so that they would not freeze. 
Fourth, assuming a violation, it was de minimis. Unit 
employees lost the opportunity to earn the compensation for the 
33 hours work by SIRTOA employees. Beyond that, no losses were 
suffered either by unit employees or by ATU. 
The crux of TA's first argument is that the work performed 
by the six SIRTOA employees required qualifications that the 
unit employees lacked. It argues that they had to engage in 
team efforts involving work in concert with the speed wing 
which could not have been performed by the unit employees. It 
also argues that the portable compressor borrowed from SIRTOA 
was sufficiently different from the stationary compressor owned 
by TA so that unit employees were not qualified to operate it. 
Related to this, it argues that TA had no need for additional 
manpower other than those working with the SIRTOA equipment 
until 7:30 p.m. It was only after the work of such employees 
had been completed that the work of the unit employees could 
commence. 
The record does not support TA's first argument. The 
evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that, except for the 
operation of the speed wing, unit employees were qualified to 
perform the work that was performed by the SIRTOA employees. 
Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed in this 
respect. 
We also affirm the ALJ's conclusion that TA's assignment 
of the unit work should not be excused on emergency grounds.-
Board - U-8005 
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The passage of several hours before calling in SIRTOA employees 
and the failure of TA to seek unit employees during this period 
persuades us of the correctness of this conclusion. 
The argument that the charge should be dismissed because 
ATU did not cooperate in providing unit employees on January 20 
is irrelevant. There is no evidence in the record that ATU 
discouraged employees from volunteering for work on January 
20. The best that can be said for TA's position is that ATU 
had been unsuccessful in recruiting employees. Furthermore, as 
noted by the ALJ. TA had the authority to seek employees on its 
own and it never even made the attempt. 
Finally, we find no merit in the TA argument that we 
should dismiss the charge on the ground that the violation was 
de minimis. Such an argument goes to the remedial order rather 
2 / than to the finding of a violation.— 
This brings us to the question of the remedial order 
herein. The exceptions do not complain about the order as 
such, but the de minimis argument inherently relates to the 
2/see Catholic Medical Center v. NLRB. 589 F2d 1166. 
100 LRRM 2225 (2d Circ. 1978). In that case, the court 
criticized a decision of the National Labor Relations Board 
for condemning conduct as being a violation which goes "to 
the very heart of the policies of the act." The court 
disagreed, finding it "one of the most inconsequential 
unfair labor practices in the history of the National Labor 
Relations Act", and remanded the matter to the Board with 
instructions that it fashion a narrower remedy. 
10438 
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remedial order. 
Reviewing that order, we reject so much of it as requires TA 
to compensate "the first six unit employees who would have been 
called for overtime duty to perform the work performed . . . who 
were available to perform said duty and who would have so 
performed . . . ." 
In doing so, we do not indicate that TA's violation was de 
minimis. On the contrary, TA's unilateral action could diminish 
the confidence of unit employees that their Taylor Law rights 
will be respected in the future. That is why the cease and 
desist and the posting obligation parts of the remedial order are 
appropriate. However, the impact of the violation upon 
individual employees was relatively inconsequential. Moreover, 
we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that the record affords an 
adequate basis for deciding which unit employees should be 
3/ compensated as a remedy for TA's violation.— 
2/Contrast State of Mew York. 16 PERB 1[3050 (1983). In 
that case we directed the reimbursement of employees even 
though the record did not provide sufficient information for a 
completely reliable determination as to which employees 
suffered losses. There are two differences here. First, the 
identification of the employees who suffered losses could be 
made with greater confidence in that case. Second, it was more 
important that the effort be made there. There was a great 
deal of money at stake in that case and the employer's 
violation was occasioned by its desire to save that money. 
Without a make-whole remedy, the employer would have retained 
the fruits of its violation. Here, the money at stake is 
relatively inconsequential and it was not a factor in 
occasioning the violation. 
13439 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the New York City Transit 
Authority to: 
1. cease and desist from unilaterally 
transferring to nonunit personnel the 
work of employees who are within the 
unit represented by the Amalgamated 
Transit Unit. Division 726, AFL-CIO. and 
2. sign and post notice in the form 
attached at all locations customarily 
used to post written communication to 
unit employees. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Zfa&t^/L w^ Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memper 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
_ PUBUC EMPLOYMENTREUCTIQm BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the New York City Transit Authority in 
the unit represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 
726, AFL-CIO that the New York City Transit Authority: 
will not unilaterally transfer to nonunit personnel the 
work of employees who are within the unit represented 
by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO. 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
0441 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2D-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES. 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE. COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
—^AFL-GIOi -----
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion of the New York State 
Inspection. Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District 
Council 82. American Federation of State. County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO (DC 82) that its dues and agency shop fee 
checkoff.privileges in the Security Services Unit be restored 
forthwith. 
On September 24, 1981, this Board found that DC 82 had 
encouraged and condoned a strike by employees in the Security 
Services Unit against the State of New York.— As a penalty 
for the strike, this Board ordered that DC 82*s dues and 
agency shop fee checkoff privileges in that unit be forfeited 
2/ for a period of 18 months.— Our decision was appealed and 
a lengthy court action ensued, but on December 12, 1985, the 
1/The strike took place at State correctional 
institutions between April 18. 1979 and May 4, 1979. 
CASE NO. D-0178 
2 / S t a t e of New York . 14 PERB 1F3069 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . 
Board - D-0178 -2 
3/ 
appeal was dismissed.- The penalty was then put into 
effect; the first pay period for which DC 82's dues and agency 
shop fees were not checked off was February 5, 1986. 
FACTS 
DC 82 has submitted several affidavits in support of its 
motion for the restoration of its checkoff privileges. These 
affidavits support three propositions. First, it has made 
exhaustive efforts to collect its dues without the benefit of 
checkoff. Second, it has expended a large amount of money on 
these efforts and has still lost a great amount of revenue. 
Third, these expenditures and loss of revenue have had a 
substantial adverse impact upon its ability to provide 
representational services to persons in its negotiating unit. 
Collection Efforts 
DC 82 has adopted five methods of collection: 
1) preauthorized transfers from bank accounts, 2) transfers 
from credit unions pursuant to checkoff, 3) direct payment by 
check or money order, 4) payment by Master Card or Visa, and 
5) hand collection. Of these, direct payment is the method 
used by the majority of the members paying dues. Checkoff 
through credit unions and hand collection also produce 
significant payments, but bank transfers and the use of Master 
Card and Visa have been relatively ineffective. The hand 
3/New York State Inspection, Security and Law 
Enforcement Employees v. PERB, F. Supp. . 18 PERB 
ir7020 (Northern Dist. of NY. 1985). 
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collection of its dues absorbs much of the time of DC 82's 
field staff and of local officers. The record-keeping 
complications occasioned by partial payments absorb much of 
the time of the central office staff. 
Cost of Collection and Loss of Income 
DC 82's expenditures in pursuit of dues during the 
months of February, March and April come to $131,456, which 
is about 24% of its normal dues income from the Security 
Services Unit. Most of these expenses involved startup 
costs; recurrent expenses in subsequent months would appear 
to amount to approximately $24,000 or 13% of normal income 
per month. 
) Relatively little dues income was received in 
February, during which time the alternative procedures were 
being put into effect. The amount received in February was 
$48,182, or 26% of the norm. In March, $105,175 was 
received, or 57% of the norm. In April, $124,416 was 
received, or 68% of the norm. Given the number of unit 
employees who are not members of DC 82, or who are members 
but support dissident factions, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the April figures approach the maximum that 
DC 82 will be able to raise in future months. 
Therefore, DC 82 will sustain a 32% loss in 
collections and a 13% cost factor. This amounts to a 45% 
burden for future months. 
Board - D-0178 
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Diminution of Services 
DC 82 has submitted materials showing that it has fallen 
behind in the processing of grievances.—' Other aspects of 
the diminished services specified in DC 82's affidavits 
include the curtailment of programs for the training of shop 
stewards in the handling of grievances because its training 
i-^ There is a letter from Kevin Breen, the Director of 
Labor Relations for the Department of Correctional Services 
of the State of New York, which complains about the delay-
in the processing of grievances. 
Field staff member LaDuke reports that he has a backlog 
of 40 contract grievances at step 3 and has not 
participated in a step 3 hearing or scheduled an 
arbitration for February, March, April or May. He 
indicates that he has not scheduled a step 2 grievance 
hearing since the middle of March. He has scheduled one 
step 2 grievance for June and has scheduled approximately 
one arbitration the week starting June 12 and into August. 
Sears, another field representative, reports that he 
has ten disciplinary cases pending, only four of which are 
scheduled, and they are scheduled to be heard in September 
and October. 
Zeller, yet another field representative, reports that 
he has approximately 35 grievances pending at step 3 and 14 
grievances pending at step 2, which have not been 
scheduled, and that it is taking him from two to three 
months to move a contract case, while in the past it took 
him about one month. 
Field staff member Cavanaugh reports that he has five 
disciplinary and 13 contract grievances pending at step 2, 
and 24 contract grievances pending at step 3, none of which 
have been scheduled. 
Dean, another field staff member, reports that he has 
had to delay one disciplinary and one contract grievance. 
1C445 
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specialist is now working full time on dues collection.-
It has also curtailed its lobbying activities on behalf of 
employee benefits which involve nonmandatory subjects of 
bargaining such as retirement benefits. Finally, several 
local officers have resigned because of the pressure of 
collecting dues, and this has deprived unit employees of 
people who have been trained to handle grievances. 
DISCUSSION 
This Board has granted motions similar to the one herein 
6 / 
on four prior occasions.— The test enunciated in the first 
of those cases and applied in the other three is that an 
employee organization would be given relief from a dues 
7/ deduction forfeiture if it demonstrates that— 
despite substantial vigorous and costly 
efforts, it has been unable to collect 
necessary income; it has shown that 
representational services have already been 
impaired and that the continuation of the 
penalty will lead to the elimination or 
diminution of other necessary and material 
services to the public employees. 
5/see CSEA (Diaz), 18 PERB 1f3047 (1985). regarding a 
public employee organization's obligation to provide such 
training. 
6/UFT, Local 2. 15 PERB 1[3091 (1982); Local 100, TWU. 
16 PERB 1f3020 (1983); ATU, Local 1056. 16 PERB 1P022 
(1983); and ATU. Local 726. 16 PERB 1[3033 (1983). 
7/15 PERB 1F3091 (1983). at p. 3138. 
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The evidence submitted by DC 82 in support of its motion 
herein is comparable to that which was found sufficient to 
grant similar motions in the four earlier cases. 
Accordingly, our application of the test applied in the 
earlier four cases dictates the granting of the motion herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE MODIFY our order to the extent that 
the forfeiture of dues and agency shop 
fee deduction privileges of DC 82 be 
suspended; that such suspension is 
subject to revocation in the event of a 
strike or strike threat. DC 82 may 
apply to this Board, on notice to the 
Governor's Office of Employee Relations 
of the State of New York, in August 1987 
for full restoration of its dues and 
agency shop fee deduction privileges. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
^4^e32 &/vL 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe£ 
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#2E-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CAMDEN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and CASE NO. U-8442 
CAMDEN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, ESQS. (JAMES P. BURNS. 3RD, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD L. BRUCE, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Camden 
Teachers Association (Association) to the dismissal of its 
charge against the Camden Central School District 
(District). The charge alleges a violation of §209-a.l(a) 
and (d) of the Taylor Law in that the District unilaterally 
changed terms and conditions of employment by directing unit 
employees assigned as coaches to refrain from chewing tobacco 
while performing coaching duties. The District acknowledges 
its unilateral action, but it defends its conduct by 
asserting that a prohibition of faculty members from using 
tobacco while working in the presence of students is a 
management prerogative. 
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The issue raised by the exceptions is the ALJ ' s 
application of this Board's balancing test.— The 
Association argues that the prohibition in question affects 
no vital interest of the District and that it may affect 
vital interests of employees who violate the directive 
because they might lose the extra compensation associated 
with coaching. 
The District argues that the prohibition does affect a 
vital interest of the District in that coaches are role 
models and. therefore, their actions in the presence of 
students may influence student conduct. It contends that the 
discouragement of student use of tobacco is a proper concern 
of a school district. It further argues that the impact of 
the prohibition on employees should be measured on the 
assumption that the employees will comply with it rather than 
violate it. On that assumption, it contends, the employee 
impact is relatively slight. 
We find the arguments of the District more persuasive. 
Indeed, we have already answered the question herein. In 
Steuben-Allegany BOCES. 13 PERB 1[3096 (1980). we dealt with a 
smoking prohibition that was applicable to work places remote 
from the students. Applying our balancing test, we found 
1/See: CSD of the City of New Rochelle. 4 PERB 1P060 
(1971); County of Rensselaer. 13 PERB 1F3080 (1980); State 
of New York. 18 PERB 1f3064 (1985); Board of Education of 
the CSD of the City of New York. 19 PERB 1F3015 (1986). 
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that the employee interests predominated. The critical 
factor, however, as noted by us (at p. 3154-5), was that the 
prohibition was imposed in a building "not normally used by 
students, thus, BOCES could not argue persuasively that the 
limitation on smoking was designed to influence student 
conduct." 
The language quoted from Steuben-Allegany BOCES focuses 
on the question before us here, albeit in the obverse. It 
indicates why, where the use of tobacco in the presence of 
students is at issue, the prohibition involves a management 
prerogative. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 18, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
C^C^LJL /^U^^lC,CL^\_ 
rold R. Newman, Chairman 
^r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




TOWN OF BETHLEHEM, 
Charging Party. 
MATTHEW J. CLYNE, ESQ.. for Respondent 
WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN & HANNA. ESQS. (MELVIN H. OSTERMAN. 
JR., ESQ. and PHILLIP G. STECK, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Bethlehem Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that PBA violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law by failing to negotiate in good 
faith with the Town of Bethlehem (Town). The nature of the 
violation is that John R. Cox, PBA's president and 
negotiator, failed to support an agreement that he had 
negotiated with the Town when it was presented to the 
membership for ratification. 
The charge, as originally brought by the Town, 
complained that PBA had failed to negotiate in good faith in 
that it petitioned for the arbitration of several demands 
CASE NO. U-8261 
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which were inappropriate for interest arbitration. One of 
these demands was for a twenty-year, half-pay retirement plan. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on this charge, the 
parties resumed negotiations on the underlying dispute. The 
Town made a comprehensive proposal, covering all unresolved 
issues, which did not include a twenty-year, half-pay 
retirement plan. On December 11, 1985, it was incorporated 
into a memorandum of agreement, and Cox agreed to "take it to 
the PBA and attempt or see if they would pass it."— 
However, Cox later tried to revive the twenty-year, half-pay 
retirement issue but was rebuffed by the Town. When, 
thereafter, the agreement was presented for ratification by 
the PBA membership. Cox did not support it. On the contrary, 
he voted against it. 
Before the time set for the submission of briefs on the 
pleaded charge, the Town moved to amend its charge to 
complain that Cox did not support ratification of the 
agreement. The hearing was reopened and, on the basis of 
evidence submitted to him, the ALJ found a violation of 
§209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law. as alleged in the amended 
charge.^ 
JL/The testimony of Cox, R-75. The District's witness 
was even more firm in his testimony that Cox undertook to 
seek ratification of the agreement. 
2/He did not deal with the original basis of the 
charge — finding it moot by reason of the parties' 
subsequent agreement. There are no exceptions directed to 
this part of his decision. 
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PBA makes three arguments in support of its exceptions. 
The first is that the ALJ erred in permitting the Town to 
amend its charge. It complains that the subject matter of 
the amendment is irrelevant to that of the original charge. 
We find no error in the ALJ's granting the Town 
permission to amend its charge. Section 204.3(d) of our 
Rules of Procedure gives an ALJ broad discretion to do so, 
and there was no abuse of discretion here. The amendment 
raised a new issue between the parties which, like the 
original issue between them, grows out of differences 
relating to their collective negotiations. It could have 
been the subject of a new charge, but PBA was not prejudiced 
by its incorporation in the original charge. 
PBA's second argument is that the ALJ erred in finding 
that the parties had reached a comprehensive agreement. In 
doing so it does not contend that there was no agreement. 
Rather, it contends that the ALJ erred in admitting evidence 
which established the agreement because the amended charge 
did not allege a comprehensive agreement, and the evidence 
therefore went beyond the scope of the amendment. The basis 
of this argument is that the Town amended a paragraph of the 
original charge which dealt with the twenty-year, half-pay 
retirement proposal. Therefore, PBA contends, evidence of an 
agreement dealing with other issues was inadmissible. 
We reject this argument. The language of the amendment 
makes it clear that the Town alleged that there was a 
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comprehensive agreement. PBA was certainly aware of this 
allegation and had a sufficient opportunity to meet it on the 
merits. 
PBA's third argument is that the ALJ erred in finding 
that Cox had been obligated to support the proposed 
agreement. There were two bases for the ALJ's conclusion. 
The first -- on the evidence -- was that Cox had undertaken 
to support the proposed agreement. The second — on the law 
-- was that Cox was reguired to support the proposed 
agreement because he had not explicitly notified the Town 
that he would not do so. 
PBA's argument is only directed to the first of the two 
bases for the ALJ's conclusion. We find that the evidence 
supports the ALJ finding in this regard. Moreover, the 
argument must be rejected as a matter of law because there is 
no evidence nor even a contention that Cox had advised the 
Town that he would not support the agreement. As noted by 
the ALJ, even without an affirmative undertaking to support 
ratification, a negotiator must do so unless, at the time 
when the agreement was reached, he advised the other side 
3/ that he would not do so.- Also, as noted by the ALJ, the 
improper failure of employee organization negotiators to 
3/See, e.g., Town of Putnam Valley, 17 PERB 1P041 
(1984). 
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support the ratification of an agreement deprives it of the 
4/ 
right to require such ratification.—' 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE FIND that PBA has violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law. and 
WE ORDER it: 
1. upon request, to execute a formal 
agreement incorporating the 
provisions of the memorandum of 
agreement dated December 11, 1985, 
and 
2. to withdraw the petition requesting 
arbitration. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem 
I/Union Springs CSD. 6 PERB 1P074 (1973) 
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#3A-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF BOMBAY, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-304 8 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 687, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All motor equipment operators and 
laborers employed in the Highway 
Department. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
F-ur-ther-,-- IT IS ORDERED t ha t the above named pub 1 i-c employ er 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 687. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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#33-6/18/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
J 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO C^ -3040 
POLICE SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
OF NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Superior Officers 
Association of Newburgh, New York has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Deputy Chief, Captains, Lieutenants and 
Sergeants. 
Excluded: Patrolmen. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Superior Officers 
Association of Newburgh, New York and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, 
and shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization 
in the determination of, and administration of. grievances of 
such employees. 
DATED: June 18, 1986 
Albany, New York 
^t^-fU^Z*^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
#3C-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF NASSAU. 
Employer. 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. 
WAREHOUEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All highway department employees except 
the Superintendent of Highways. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-3047 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany, New York 
teL4>-»**-4<~*L_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb, 
IC461 
#3D-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MASSAPEQUA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
an(3 CASE NO.G—3 0 55 
MASSAPEQUA PARAPROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT. AFT, 
Petitioner.-
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Massapequa Paraprofessional 
Association, NYSUT, AFT has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles: 
cafeteria aide, hall monitor, 
playground monitor, receptionist, 
attendance aide, parking lot monitor. 
Excluded: Substitutes and all other employees. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Massapequa Paraprofessional 
Association, NYSUT, AFT and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: June 18. 1986 
Albany. New York 
iL^ocr^Cei^x 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memaer 
#3E-6/l8/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COPIAGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and-: CASE NO. C.-3044 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 870. LOCAL 
1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner^ 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Suffolk Educational Local 870, Local 1000, AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teaching Assistants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Suffolk Educational Local 870, Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: June 18, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memoer 
